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McALLISTER BROTHERS v. UNITED STATES 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 17 November 1989 
890F.2d582 
The mere fact that the U. S. Coast Guard had considered improving the marking configuration of a reef, together with its 
knowledge of prior vessel casualties on the reef, did not give rise to a duty to improve its then existing �arkers for the reef •. 
FACTS: The Barge McAllister #80 was being pushed by the 
tug Majorie McAllister. The two vessels were lashed togther, in a 
configuration forming an integrated tug and barge unit 445 feet 
long. The mate on watch during the grounding was Anthony J. 
McAllister, III, who had received his mates license in 1981 and 
joined the tug as mate in July, 1982. Mr. McAllister had made 
one prior trip, as a tug mate, up the Hudson to Albany. 
The mate had relieved the watch at 1750 hours in the vicinity 
of the Tappan Zee Bridge, and had available to him a seven inch 
Decca radar and applicable charts of the Hudson River. The tug 
and barge were proceeding at nine knots with an additional one 
knot due to the flood current, making the true speed over ground 
ten knots. The weather during the time of the grounding was clear 
although the shadows were considerable along the river's edge. 
The reef on which the barge grounded, Diamond Reef, lies in 
the center of the river and is charted to be 100 yards wide with a 
minimum depth of 5 feet inside the 18 foot curve. The chart 1234 7, 
provides the above information and shows the reef area tinted in 
blue. The chart also shows two channels, one on the east side of 
the river and a wider one on the west. 
The reef is marked by a single buoy to its south. The buoy is 
attached to a concrete sinker with a chain. Its length permits the 
buoy to withstand the pressures of the current, wind and winter 
ice. The Coast Guard publication, Light List stated that the 
Diamond Reef lighted buoy was replaced by an unlighted nun 
buoy during winter months. The Diamond Reef buoy was also 
painted to show that the preferred channel was to the west. The 
lower court found that the buoy would move in a north south 
direction for a few yards due to the current. 
At the trial, experts showed that the preferred channel past 
the reef was to the west. Also brought out at trial, was the cost of 
installing a ice resistant warning which would have been $600,000. 
The evidence showed that during the 13 years prior to 1983, 
over 1.2 million vessels passed the reef area, which was then 
marked by only the southerly buoy. 
Prior to the accident the Coast Guard had considered improving 
the marking of the reef, due to three specific vessel casualties 
caused by passing the marker within 50 feet. 
Mr. McAllister stated that on the date of the accident, he 
observed the Diamond Reef buoy by radar at a distance of 1.5 
miles. He stated that he attempted to pass the buoy to the west 
by at least 140 feet. Mate McAllister found, after the grounding, 
he was 150 feet from the buoy. At a Coast Guard hearing, Mr. 
McAllister admitted culpability by saying he had let down his 
fellow employees. 
ISSUE: Whether the U.S. Government breached its duty to 
mariners by allowing the buoy to be mispositioned or whether 
there was a duty to use other means to adequately mark the reef? 
ANALYSIS: The appellants McAllister Brothers Inc. <McAllister 
Bros.) in this case were relying on the Eklof Marine Corp. v. 
United States 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985), decision which stated 
that the Coast Guard was, "under a duty to place the buoy in 
such a position that mariners who follow normal practice would 
not be enticed to enter upon a danger that otherwise might have 
been avoided." ld at 203. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in this case 
however agreed with the trier of fact, that the buoy was not 
mispositioned and that more buoys were not necessary to mark 
the obstruction adequately. The Court acknowledged that the 
buoy marking for Diamond Reef was subsequently changed, but 
stated the Coast Guard has been granted broad discretion in the 
marking of obstructions to navigation. 
The Court was not persuaded by the McAllister Bros. argument 
that the chain length attached to the buoy was excessive and the 
actual position of the buoy was improper. McAllister Bros. 
showed that the chain length was 135 feet while the water depth 
was only 50 feet, and stated that the considerable length of chain 
created a range of movement of 125.39 feet. The court was not 
persuaded by this argument due to the testimony of a licensed 
Hudson River pilot, Captain Sherwood Patrick, who stated that 
the buoy would be either going upstream or downstream according 
to the current. The pilot also stated that during the 150 trips he 
made on the river, the buoy was only a few yards out of its 
east-west placement. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's finding in 
favor of the Government. The Court stated that the cause of the 
grounding was attritutable solely to the inexperience of the pilot 
and his undue concern about the shoreline of the Hudson River. 
Edward F. Kenny '90 
STOCKSTILL v. PETTY RAY GEOPHYSICAL 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 29 November 1989 
838 F .2d 149 3 
Barge owner is liable to bareboat charterer for failing to comply with charter provision requiring it to name charterer as 
additional insured under its P&I policy. Barge owner's failure to file a timely notice of appeal, precluded appelate review 
of the dismissal of its third party action against the P&I insurer. 
FACTS: Terry Wayne Stockstill (Stockstill) was injured while 
unloading seismic equipment from a barge, the BB-300. He sued 
his employer Petty Ray Geophysical, a division of Geosource, 
Inc. ( GeosourceJ; the barge owner Thomas A. Blankenship d/b/a 
B&B Operators <B&BJ; and various other defendants under the 
Jones Act and general maritime law. Gedsource cross-claimed 
against B&B, and B&B filed a third party claim against its P&I 
insurer. Geosource and Stockstill settled prior to trial which left 
only Geosource's cross-claims and B&B's third plarty claim to 
be adjudicated. 
Geosource operated the barge as bareboat or demise charterer. 
B&B agreed to have its P&I insurance policy endorsed to name 
Geosource as an additional insured. Since B&B failed to do so, 
Geosource argues that B&B must stand in the shoes of the P&I 
insurer. B&B claims that its P&I insurance agent, Barly, 
Martin and Fay of Louisiana, Inc. <BMFJ failed to endorse 
B&B's P&I insurance to include Geosource as an additional 
insured. 
Before trial Geosource and B&B stipulated to the following 
facts: ( 1) Stockstill was employed by Geosource as a Jones Act 
seaman and he was a member of the crew of a fleet of vessels 
including the barge BB-300; (2) Stockstill's injury aboard the 
barge was caused solely by the negligence of a fellow employee, 
Sandidge; (3) the barge was not unseaworthy; and (4) the 
amount of money owed Geosource after it settled with Stockstill. 
The District Court held that B&B was not liable to Geosource 
and that BMF, therefore was not liable to B&B. Geosource filed 
(continues .. .) 
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a notice of appeal from the dismissal of its claim against B&B. 
B&B did not file a notice of appeal from the dimissal of its claim 
against BMF. 
BMF contends that B&B may not appeal this determination 
because it failed to file a notice of appeal and that Geosource has 
no standing to appeal this dismissal because it never filed a claun 
against BMF. 
ISSUES: ( 1J Is B&B liable to Geosource? 
<2J May appellate jurisdiction be exercised over the 
clai lT: against BMF? 
ANALYSIS: The District Court relied upon Lanasse v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1971) in dismtssing Geosource's 
claim against B&B. Geosource's claim was based upon the fact 
that it would have been covered, had B&B ir.cluded Geosource 
as an additional insured on B&B's P&I policy, as agreed. The 
Lanasse case stated that a charterer could be covered by an 
owner's P&I policy if ( 1) the accident was caused by a vessel or 
its crew and (2) liability flowed from the insured's status as 
vessel owner. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, found, 
contrary to the district court, that Stockstill and Sandidge were 
crew members of the BB-300. In fact, the parties stipulated that 
Stockstill was a member of the crew of the 11eet of vessels which 
included the barge. Geosource also passes the second requirment 
because, as a demise or bareboat charterer, it may be considered 
a vessel "owner" for the purposes of P&I coverage. 
Since B&B breached its agreement to have its P&I insurance 
endorsed to name Goesource as an additional insured it must 
provide such coverage to Geosource. 
The Court of Appeals rejected B&B's contention, relying on 
Anthony v. Petroleum Helecoptors, Inc., 693 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 
1982) and Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 \9th 
Cir. 1981), that an initial notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 
\ 4 )(a)( 1 J is mandatory and jurisdictional but a notice of protec­
tive or cross-appeal under Rule \4HaH3J is permissive and 
courts of appeal may retain all parties in order to do justice. 
The Court stated that it is questionable whether Anthony or 
Bryant remains good law in light of Torres v. Oakland Scavenger 
Co., 487 U.S. _, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 \ 1988J which 
held that the requirments of Rules 3 and 4 are mandatory and 
jurisdictional and that although the courts of appeal may liberally 
construe those rules to determine whether they have been complied 
with, the courts may not waive non-compliance. 
The Court held, that even if Anthony or Bryant is good law, 
the present case does not fall within the exception. The exception 
is only available when the appealed decision could be read as not 
being adverse to the party who failed to file timely notice of 
appeal. B&B may not take advantage of this exception because 
the dismissal of its claim was clearly adverse to it. 
Seh-Yoon Park '91 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LAKE SHORE INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 20 September 1989 
886F.2d 654 
Where defendant does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to justify the exercise of personal. 
jurisdiction, neither a general "stream of commerce" theory nor the unique nature of ocean-going vessels will support the 
exercise of personal jurisditction. 
FACTS: In April of 1985, General Electric Company <GEl 
shipped a turbine accessory base aboard the M/V Paul Bunyon. 
While the base was being loaded aboard the vessel a cargo winch 
allegedly malfunctioned causing the base to fall and become 
damaged. At the time of the accident the vessel was docked in 
Charleston, South Carolina. Under its contract of insurance, 
Federal Insurance Company <Federal) paid GE $322,543.46 fi>r 
the damaged base. Plaintiff-appellant, Federal, a New Jersey 
Corporation, thus became entitled to the subrogated claim of GE. 
The M/V Paul Bunyon was designed and manufactured by 
defendant-appellee Peterson Builders Inc. <Peterson), a 
Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in 
Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, engaged in the design and manufacture 
of ocean-going vessels. Defendant-appellee, Lake Shore Inc. 
<Lake Shore), is a Michigan corporation engaged in the design, 
manufacture, and sale of cargo winches, with its principal place 
of business in Iron Mountain, Michigan. 
The Lake Shore cargo winch installed on the M/V Paul Bun yon 
was manufactured in Michigan and the vessel was designed and 
manufactured in Wisconsin for American Heavy Lift Shipping 
Company <AHL), a Delaware corporation. The contract of sale 
between Peterson and AHL was executed in Wisconsin and 
Pennsylvania. AHL accepted delivery of the vessel in 
Wisconsin. 
In March of 1988, Federal filed suit against Peterson, Lake 
Shore and American Ship Management <American) in the United 
States District Court for the District of South Carolina, involving 
the court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. American is a 
Delaware Corporation that hired the vessel's crew and handled 
the vessel's insurance needs. Federal sought to recover the 
$322,543.46 paid to GE plus interest and costs, for causes of action 
including: negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and 
implied warranties. Peterson and Lake Shore entered special 
appearances and moved to dismiss for lack of in personam 
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jurisdiction. American moved for summary judgment. The district 
court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendants and granted Federal's and Lake Shore's motion to 
dismiss and American's motion for summary judgment. 
Federal appealed the district court's grant of Lake Shore's 
and Peterson's motion to dismiss. 
Lake Shore and Peterson do not maintain offices in South 
Carolina and are not licensed to do business in that state. 
Neither has agents, employees or subsidiaries in South Carolina 
and neither maintains a bank account or owns real or personal 
property in the state. Also, all of Lake Shore's products and 
materials sold to South Carolina residents have been shipped 
F.O.B. Michigan. 
ISSUES: 1J Do defendants have sufficient "minimum con­
tacts" with South Carolina such that the exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction would not offend the "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice" embodied in the constitutional principles 
of due process? 
2) In the absence of such "minimum contacts" will a 
general stream of commerce theory or the unique nature of ocean­
going vessels support the exercise of personal jurisdiction? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit, 
affirmed the district court's finding that defendants lacked suf­
ficient "minimum contacts" with South Carolina to be amenable 
to suit there. The court also held that without such contacts 
neither the nature of ocean-going vessels nor a stream of com­
merce theory supported the exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
over defendants. 
The court noted that Congress had not authorized nation­
wide service of process in admiralty cases so that South 
Carolina's long-arm statute (construed to extend jurisdiction "to 
(continues .. .) 
